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1.  The political economy of agriculture in 
Southern Africa
Elizabeth Ransom
INTRODUCTION
Agriculture remains the primary source of employment and income 
for most of the rural populations of Southern Africa (Hachigonta et 
al. 2013). When focusing on the political economy of agriculture and 
food in the region, Europe and European legislation have played a 
dominant role in both the past and the present. All the countries under 
discussion were impacted by colonial rule, and at present there is a 
significant   disparity between commercial and smallholder agriculture. 
While the disparity is one of the consequences of colonialism and South 
African apartheid policies in the region, this disparity is exacerbated by 
current European Union (EU) trade policies. With future challenges 
related to climate change, combined with declining EU market access 
and struggles to better integrate smallholders into income generating 
activities, the Southern African region is in need of a new map with 
which to navigate towards a future that ensures a vibrant agricultural 
sector.
Defining the Scope
Depending upon the year and political organization one references, the 
Southern Africa community consists of anywhere from five to fifteen 
countries. For example, the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) now considers fifteen countries as falling within the region. 
However, the United Nations (UN) defines Southern Africa as consist-
ing of five countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Swaziland (see Figure 1.1). For the purposes of this overview the following 
discussion will largely be limited to the UN defined countries, although 
with occasional references to other SADC countries.
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AGRICULTURE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA IN THE 
PAST AND THE PRESENT: COMMON LINKAGES
Geography and climate play critical roles in shaping the agricultural land-
scape of the region. The average rainfall in Southern Africa is low, with 
the least amount of rainfall occurring in the west (Namibia) and increasing 
incrementally as one moves east (the eastern coast of South Africa and 
portions of Swaziland and Lesotho receive the most). However, rainfall is 
episodic and vast regions of Southern Africa experience regular droughts 
(Hachigonta et al. 2013).
Rainfall is important because of the prevalence of rain- fed crops and 
the role that livestock, particularly cattle, play in the region’s agricultural 
system. For the vast majority of Africa, irrigation does not play a sig-
nificant role in agriculture. A 2010 International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) report notes that “irrigated area as a share of total 
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Figure 1.1 Map of Southern African countries
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 cultivated area is estimated at only 6 percent for Africa, compared with 37 
percent for Asia and 14 percent for Latin America” (You et al. 2010: 1). 
Within Africa, the bulk of irrigation is actually located in Northern 
Africa, whereas the only country in Southern Africa with approximately 
1 million hectares irrigated is South Africa, and this represents less than 
10  percent of agricultural lands within the country (You et al. 2010). 
In sum, Southern African producers are highly dependent on rainfall 
for growing crops. This dependency, when combined with weather pat-
terns that are expected to become more erratic due to climate change 
and increasing water needs for other economic sectors, will significantly 
impact agricultural productivity in the future.
Rainfall also impacts the amount of grasses available for grazing cattle. 
Historically, cattle populations have increased or declined based on the 
amount of rainfall. For example, in Botswana the peak cattle population, 
due to the availability of grass, has hovered around 3 million (in 1979 
and 2002), with dramatic declines in cattle populations during periods of 
drought (BIDPA 2006). Rainfall also affects the ability for farmers to rear 
cattle using more intensive methods of production (feedlots as opposed to 
pasture) due to limited availability of water for cattle and for growing the 
crops used for cattle feed. Water constraints, in combination with cultural 
traditions, have limited the number of producers in Southern Africa that 
have adopted the industrial model of cattle farming.
In the past, and into the present, cattle have played a critical role in 
Southern African agriculture. Scholars of Southern Africa history have 
long been interested in exactly when domesticated livestock began to 
appear in Southern Africa, because their appearance would signify a shift 
from hunter- gathering societies to food producing societies. Cattle are 
thought to have appeared in Southern Africa approximately 2,000 years 
ago (Sadr 2013). Sadr (2013: 171) summarizes that many, including the 
popular author Jarrod Diamond (1998), view this shift to food production 
as a “first step towards the rise of economically, socially, and politically 
more complex societies, and ultimately of civilization.” However, Sadr 
counters that the archeological evidence is far from conclusive about 
such grand results. He argues that the introduction of domesticated cattle 
approximately 2,000 years ago does not correlate with significant changes 
in other domains of material culture (Sadr 2013: 179). Regardless of when 
hunters transitioned to pastoralists, the historical record does reveal that 
cattle were crucial for obtaining wives among the Early Iron Age Bantu- 
speaking farmers and herders (Sadr 2013). The multi- dimensional impor-
tance of cattle continues to this day for many indigenous ethnic groups in 
Southern Africa.
Cattle as “a bank on hooves” is a phrase often used to describe the use 
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of cattle by indigenous populations in Southern Africa. This phrase refers 
to the fact that many smallholders view cattle as their investment, which 
can be turned into cash as needed, in addition to providing fresh milk 
for home consumption (see Schwalbach, Groenewald, and Marfo 2001; 
Ferguson 1990). There is also the view that cattle ownership lends status or 
prestige (i.e., the more cattle one owns the higher one’s status) and, as pre-
viously mentioned, is important for lobola (the negotiated number of cattle 
a groom’s family gives to the bride’s family). The degree to which various 
indigenous smallholders subscribe to the use of cattle as prestige, and for 
the purposes of lobola, varies by ethnic group, geographical location (e.g., 
urban versus rural), and, based on the author’s own observations, socio- 
economic status among people within the same community (e.g., those 
with higher socio- economic status having the ability to purchase cattle; 
also see, Schwalbach et al. 2001). However, the practice of keeping cattle 
for cash- related reasons generally persists among most of the indigenous 
ethnic groups in Southern Africa. A consequence of this is that while there 
are large commercial cattle operations in South Africa, and to a lesser 
extent Namibia and Botswana, the vast majority of cattle in Southern 
Africa are located in smallholder, subsistence agricultural systems.
Despite the rather long history of cattle ownership and the social, cul-
tural, and economic significance associated with cattle, the rise of colonial-
ism in Southern Africa marked a period of removal of indigenous people 
and their cattle from their lands. Indigenous Southern Africans were con-
fined to a limited amount of land, also known as reserves, beginning in the 
colonial period, which contributed to overcrowding. Depending upon the 
government in power and the time period, little to no government support 
for developing infrastructure or facilitating appropriate land management 
occurred in the reserves,1 which when combined with overcrowded condi-
tions further contributed to highly degraded soils.
As the region under discussion is diverse and involves different colonial 
and post- colonial histories, it is beneficial to briefly review each country’s 
agrifood sector. Common concerns across the five countries are then exam-
ined. Finally, the challenges for the future are discussed in the conclusion.
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY AGRICULTURAL 
OVERVIEWS
South Africa
Due to the sheer size of the economy, South Africa plays a dominant 
role on the continent and in shaping the agricultural economies of the 
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other  countries in Southern Africa. South Africa is a major producer 
of sugar, maize, dairy, chicken, grapes, apples, and beef among many 
other commodities. South Africa is the only country in this region that 
is currently capable of producing all its own basic foodstuffs (Agritrade 
2011). The country also has a large food processing sector and a 
number of well- developed export markets, with agriculture accounting 
for 4.5 percent of GDP and the food processing sector accounting for an 
additional 10 percent of GDP (Agritrade 2011). The size of both South 
Africa’s economy and their population relative to the other nations means 
that regional agricultural production and policy debates “take place in 
the shadow” of South African dominance (Agritrade 2011: 1). South 
Africa’s population represents 35 percent of the entire SADC region and 
73 percent of GDP for the region (Hachigonta et al. 2013). In addition, 
there are many historical linkages between South Africa and the larger 
region, in particular in policies that encourage economic interdependency 
and a demand for migrant laborers, especially for mining (Botha 2013; 
O’Laughlin et al. 2013). Thus, all four of the other countries under con-
sideration in this discussion are dependent on South Africa as an export 
market for specific commodities (in the case of Lesotho, a primary export 
to South Africa is water) and for imports of basic foodstuffs. Despite the 
seemingly “successful” agricultural sector of South Africa, the sector has 
been critiqued for the degree to which it has imitated the United States and 
Canada in terms of its resource intensiveness and environmental degrada-
tion (Mather 1996). In addition, South Africa and Namibia share a post- 
colonial agricultural history which contributes to both countries having 
dual economies within the sector (see Lipton and Simkins 1993).
South Africa and Namibia each have a well- developed, predominantly 
white commercial agricultural sector alongside an indigenous smallholder, 
subsistence agriculture sector. The dual economies found within the agri-
cultural sector are directly linked to past colonial and apartheid policies, 
which among other things included removal of indigenous people from 
much of the better agricultural lands and policies that “encouraged” 
indigenous populations to seek work in formal, white- controlled, labor 
markets. At present, reducing the dual economies to a minimum requires 
land reform, as most smallholders suffer from insecure land tenure and/
or access to land that is inadequate in size or soil quality to allow them a 
competitive advantage.
In the case of South Africa, land reform has largely been unsuccess-
ful. The lack of success is beyond the scope of this discussion, but it is 
important to note that in general, along with the significant social and 
political changes that South Africans have experienced in the past two 
decades, farmers were significantly impacted by economic  liberalization 
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policies. State support to farmers was dismantled and import tariffs 
reduced in the 1990s, which left many farmers unable to compete with 
farmers from developed countries in specific commodity markets, like 
those for milk and wheat, but increased opportunities for some farmers in 
other sectors, particularly high- value export markets, like citrus and game 
meat (Goldblatt 2004). The social, cultural, and economic changes have 
contributed to a significant decline in the number of farmers (31 percent 
decrease, or 40,000 fewer farmers from 1993 to 2008) and farmworkers in 
South Africa (1.6 million in 1971 to approximately 800,000 in 2007) and 
an increase in concentration within the commercial agricultural sector 
(Goldblatt 2004; O’Laughlin et al. 2013). Ultimately, larger, commercial 
South African agricultural production may feed much of Southern Africa, 
but it does so using industrial agricultural techniques that are resource 
intensive (especially in terms of water) and without employing large tracts 
of rural labor and, therefore, without providing an income source for the 
large number of rural inhabitants in the region (O’Laughlin et al. 2013).
Namibia
The dual agricultural economy in Namibia is directly linked to the deci-
mation of the indigenous populations under German rule and the imposi-
tion of South Africa’s governance, particularly apartheid policies. The 
indigenous people of what is now known as Namibia, were first brutally 
colonized by the Germans (1885–1915), and then controlled by South 
Africa for more than 70 years, finally achieving independence in 1990. 
Botha (2013) recounts that from the 1920s to the 1950s the South African 
government was especially preoccupied with resettling whites onto lands, 
which expanded upon resettlement practices that Germans had begun 
prior to 1915. After the end of German rule, Botha claims that indigenous 
Africans briefly hoped for the opportunity to become pastoralists again, 
by restoring their herds and reclaiming access to land. However, South 
Africa viewed indigenous African men as a ready labor supply for the 
mines, thus local Africans’ hopes were short lived (Ibid.: 236). In addi-
tion, after 1950 South Africa began to counter previous German initia-
tives of mixed- farming operations and equitable water supplies (with the 
goal of food self- sufficiency) and instead moved to the narrow pursuit of 
“karakul or meat monocultures – heavily capitalised industrial ranches” 
among white, commercial producers (Botha 2013: 234 citing Lau and 
Reiner 1993: 58). Despite Namibia gaining independence in 1990, Botha 
(2013: 249) observes that most indigenous communal farmers “continue 
to be hamstrung by limited stock numbers, lack of quality grazing land, 
inadequate support services and recurrent drought.”
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As of 2010 Namibian agriculture represented 7.4 percent of the overall 
GDP, which includes fishing and hunting (AfDB 2012). Cattle remain one 
of the most important sub- sectors within agriculture, but other significant 
exports include fish, karakul sheep pelts, and live sheep to South Africa 
(although the government regulates live sheep sales). Despite a few well- 
developed commercial agricultural sub- sectors, the majority of population 
in Namibia is rural and relies upon subsistence agriculture. The dual agri-
cultural economy reflects, at least in part, the fact that Namibia, despite 
being considered an upper middle- income country, is among the most 
inequitable societies in the world in terms of income distribution (World 
Bank 2014). In fact, along with Namibia, South Africa and Botswana 
rank among the highest countries for average levels of development on the 
African continent, but all three also have some of the highest rates of ine-
quality (McKeever 2008).2 Thus, the Namibian government is interested 
in trying to expand formal labor market opportunities in all sub- sectors of 
the economy. In the case of agriculture, the government has focused on the 
fishing industry (e.g., improved resource management) and redistribution 
of lands for the purposes of resettling smallholders.
Botswana
Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, in contrast to South Africa and 
Namibia, can all be characterized as having primarily smallholder agricul-
ture, and they all share the unique status of having been considered British 
protectorates up until they gained independence from the British in the 
1960s (thereby evading formal rule by South Africa and the imposition 
of apartheid policies). However, similar to Namibia, a large percentage 
of young indigenous men in all three countries have migrated out of rural 
areas to find work in mining. Many of those mines are located in South 
Africa, although mines exist throughout the region. Thus, rural areas 
often became repositories of women, children, and the elderly, who lacked 
steady incomes. Ferguson (1990), in his detailed study of Lesotho, also 
argues that the cattle economy stayed strong in many of these rural spaces 
because men working in the mines could buy cattle with their mine wages 
and keep the cattle in their home spaces as a mechanism for securing their 
money (ensuring it would not be spent while they were away) and as a way 
of maintaining connections to their homes.
Botswana’s agricultural sector as a portion of GDP is quite small 
(2.94  percent in 2012), but agriculture, particularly livestock farming, 
remains an important activity for the purposes of diversifying the economy 
(the bulk of Botswana’s GDP comes from mining). The agricultural sector 
is also a source of jobs and food security in rural areas, and livestock 
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 ownership is culturally highly valued. The dominant Tswana group (com-
prising 79 percent of the population) is one of the ethnic groups in Southern 
Africa that value cattle for social, cultural, and economic reasons.
Due to climate, Botswana is very limited in terms of the amount of 
land that is suitable for crop production. At present crop production is 
limited to 1 percent of a possible 5 percent of land suitable for cultiva-
tion (Zhou et al. 2013). This means that the vast majority of commodities 
(e.g., maize, wheat, sorghum) are imported primarily from South Africa. 
Cattle production is the only significant agricultural export commodity 
for the country (Zhou et al. 2013: 52). In recent years the amount of beef 
exported to Europe has steadily declined, and since 2010 it has experienced 
periods of interruption due to European concerns over disease control and 
lax enforcement of traceability requirements (Ransom 2011). Botswana is 
unique in that the vast majority of cattle are reared on communal lands 
(85 percent), and cattle reared in both communal and commercial produc-
tion are exported (whereas in most Southern African countries only cattle 
reared on commercial farms qualify for export). This unique aspect of the 
industry has to do with longstanding government support for communal 
production and an elaborate system of fences and traceability technology 
put in place (with government funding) to meet the export criteria set by 
European governments.
Lesotho
Agriculture accounts for about 10 percent of Lesotho’s GDP and is the 
main source of employment in rural areas (Gwimbi et al. 2013). The 
majority of the country lives in rural areas (82 percent), and 58 percent of 
the population engaged in agriculture are female (World Bank 2013). The 
majority of the population remains dependent on subsistence agriculture, 
and there has been an uptick in droughts, which has increased food inse-
curity. It is estimated that Lesotho grows approximately 30 percent of its 
own food (Gwimbi et al. 2013). The amount produced has declined over 
the past several years, which is attributed to increasing number of people 
settling on arable land near cities, erratic weather patterns, soil degrada-
tion, and declining productivity (e.g., due to lack of fertilizer) (Frenken 
2005; Gwimbi et al. 2013). Part of the declining productivity has to do with 
declining remittances from mine workers. Historically, people living in 
rural areas have relied on remittances from men working in South African 
mines to purchase inputs for farming (World Bank 2013). However, in 
the past few decades remittances have declined due to a decline in mine 
employment.
Cultivable land is limited to approximately 11 percent of the total area 
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of the country, of which the most common crops are maize (60 percent), 
sorghum (10–20 percent), wheat (10 percent) and beans (6 percent) 
(Frenken 2005). Despite the popularity of growing maize, Lesotho must 
import an estimated 65 percent of the population’s maize requirement and 
80 percent of the population’s annual wheat requirements (Frenken 2005). 
Livestock, particularly cattle, sheep, and goats, are prevalent, although 
they primarily exist as part of subsistence agriculture, and cattle are con-
sidered a major contributor to land degradation in the country (Gwimbi 
et al. 2013).
Water is considered Lesotho’s most important natural resource, but 
the amount of rain received is erratic and scientists predict that water 
resources will be increasingly scarce with climate change. Irrigation pro-
jects in Lesotho have long been a priority, but most projects over the past 
40 years have not been successful. The lack of success has been attributed 
to a “top- down and supply- driven approach on the part of government 
and donors and little consultation with, or participation by, farmers” 
(Frenken 2005: 303). Supposedly, the government is now pursuing irriga-
tion projects that are “farmer- and market- led” and “based on small- scale 
schemes provided for and managed by the farmers themselves” (Frenken 
2005: 308).
Swaziland
Agriculture accounts for approximately 8.4 percent of Swaziland’s GDP 
(Thwala 2011), with 70 percent of the labor force engaged in agriculture. 
Unofficial unemployment is estimated at approximately 40 percent, and 
it is even higher in rural areas (Manyatsi et al. 2013). Similar to Lesotho, 
some of the rising unemployment is due to retrenchment in South African 
labor mines.
Swaziland’s agricultural sector is bifurcated into a commercial, largely 
export sector focused on sugarcane, citrus, and forestry and a large sub-
sistence sector marked by declining productivity. As such the country 
imports approximately 60 percent of all its food requirements, with 
almost all the imports coming from South Africa (Manyatsi et al. 2013). 
Sugarcane is the main export crop (95 percent of all sugarcane produced 
is exported). Moreover, 85 percent of irrigated lands are dedicated to sug-
arcane (Manyatsi et al. 2013). The African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA)3 has been important for bolstering Swaziland’s apparel industry 
and cotton production, which supplies the apparel industry. However, 
cotton production declined significantly during the drought from 2002 
to 2007, and currently not enough cotton is grown to support the apparel 
sector – so cotton is imported (Manyatsi et al. 2013).
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Within subsistence agriculture, livestock is an important sub- sector. 
Similar to Lesotho, Botswana, and portions of Namibia and South 
Africa, cattle as a sub- sector is often associated with high stocking density, 
overgrazing, and soil erosion (Thwala 2011). Unlike cattle, poultry are 
viewed as primarily a women’s domain and they are viewed as providing 
a much needed source of food.4 According to a report by Thwala (2011), 
Swaziland does not import any broiler meat and eggs as the local produc-
tion meets demand.
ISSUES FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION: MARKET 
ACCESS, SMALLHOLDERS, LAND TENURE, AND 
GENDER
Market Access: Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations and the 
EU Market
Since the advent of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, Africa 
has increasingly lost market share in Europe for their agrifood products 
(Daviron 2008). Gibbon and Ponte (2005) argue that with the advent 
of the WTO, developing countries lost some of their autonomy in trade 
negotiations. Whereas previously developing countries were able to ask 
for concessions in recognition of the qualitatively different challenges they 
faced, current trade agreements do not allow for a recognition of qualita-
tive differences between countries. Instead there is an assumption that 
developing countries are simply at a “lower” stage of development and 
need more time to implement the new requirements.
Part of the impact of the WTO on Southern Africa has been long- term 
loss of preferential market access for specific goods (e.g., beef, sugar) 
that was assured under the Lomé Convention, which was negotiated in 
1975 between the European Community and 46 African, Caribbean, and 
Pacific countries (Hurt 2012). Preferential access was deemed as not in 
compliance with the WTO’s “no special and differential treatment” stipu-
lation5 and the EU has moved to negotiating free trade agreements, or 
what are called Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Initially the 
EU pursued regional EPA negotiations, but overtime more negotiations 
have been occurring between individual countries. This approach has 
been problematic for Southern Africa countries, in part because the EU 
is attempting to negotiate for what are considered “behind the border” 
issues, like “transparency in government procurement, national treatment 
for foreign investors, and trade facilitation measures” (Hurt 2012: 502)6 
– all items that developing countries resisted at the WTO Doha Rounds.
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In addition, Hurt (2012: 496) argues that the EPA negotiations in 
Southern Africa are a means for the EU to “lock in” the neoliberal devel-
opment model and thus advance the EU’s hegemonic position within the 
region. This is taking place by limiting the policy options available to 
developing countries’ governments for pursuing their own development. 
Finally, the EPA negotiations are said to be potentially undermining the 
political legitimacy of several Southern African political and economic 
organizations, including SADC and the Southern Africa Customs Union 
(SACU). This is because many of the EPA negotiations between indi-
vidual African countries and the EU are contradictory to existing SADC 
and SACU agreements, thereby challenging the continuing legitimacy of 
these organizations (Hurt 2012). Many leaders in the Southern African 
region believe a regional approach is needed to tackle complex social and 
economic problems that are beyond the abilities of any one nation- state 
(e.g., increasing food security, reducing unemployment through the pro-
motion of wildlife tourism, tackling HIV/AIDS) (McKeever 2008). It is 
within this framework that the potentially negative consequences of EU 
EPA negotiations which directly contradict regional institutional agree-
ments must be understood.
Increasingly, some “behind the borders” issues built into the EPAs 
that shape agricultural production in Southern Africa focus on techni-
cal specifications, for example related to animal welfare and traceability 
policies. The increasing focus on technical specifications has contributed 
to mounting pressure on smallholder agriculture. The pressure on small-
holders occurs because many technical specifications favor systems of 
production already in place among larger, commercial producers, and/or 
due to economies of scale, smallholder agriculturalists cannot afford to 
implement new specifications as dictated by the EU (see Ransom 2011). In 
combination with economic policies that have pushed for market deregu-
lation in the region, smallholders exist in a production environment that 
is extremely competitive, and those wishing to expand generally exist in a 
hostile environment (Lahiff and Cousins 2005: 127).7
Smallholders
In all five countries under examination here, there is a preponderance 
of smallholder agriculture. The percentage of the population that can 
be identified as smallholders varies widely between countries, with an 
estimated 61 percent of producers being smallholders within the broader 
SADC community (SADC 2008). Despite significant efforts on the part 
of governments and technical experts (e.g., economists, agricultural sci-
entists) to reduce smallholder agriculture and encourage more market 
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integration, smallholders remain important throughout the region in that 
they provide household food security and rural employment, and more 
generally provide buffers against periods of economic downturns (Bayer, 
von Lossau, and Feldmann 2003). Many studies have focused on small-
holder agriculture in Africa (Collier and Dercon 2014; Jayne, Mather, 
and Mghenyi 2010), though not all have focused on the countries in this 
analysis. Nonetheless, the themes and issues that emerge inform debates 
and policies for this region.
First, despite the label, smallholders represent a diverse group, with some 
evidence of growing disparities between smallholders in terms of land and 
asset holdings (see Jayne et al. 2010). In the case of Botswana, it appears 
that cattle ownership is increasingly concentrated among a small number 
of communal farmers (Ransom 2011).8 Second, the productivity levels of 
smallholders are highly variable. In all five countries under consideration, 
smallholders are usually dependent on other forms of income (e.g., remit-
tances, state welfare). Thus, if these forms of income decline, there is gener-
ally a decline in the inputs smallholders are able to purchase (e.g., fertilizer), 
which can impact productivity. All smallholders throughout the region are 
also highly vulnerable to climatic shocks, particularly drought. In the case 
of livestock ownership, this usually means many cattle are sold off at lower 
prices during periods of drought. Finally, smallholders are increasingly 
vulnerable to what Jayne et al. (2010) refer to as governance issues. This 
includes declining donor support for smallholders, as well as economic trade 
agreements that disadvantage smallholders, and land tenure policies. In 
conclusion, Jayne et al. (2010: 1394) argue, “most small farms in Africa are 
becoming increasingly unviable as sustainable economic and social units. 
Unless government policy is changed radically, the world may see increas-
ingly frequent and severe economic and social crises in Sub- Saharan Africa.”
Land Tenure and Reform
As previously noted, land tenure issues tend to go hand- in- hand with 
smallholder agriculture. South Africa and Namibia are both countries 
formally grappling with the issue of land redistribution. In South Africa, 
as of 2000, Black South Africans comprised 75 percent of the population, 
but were limited to 13 percent of the land, which comprised the former 
homelands. As of 2004, land reform in South Africa had managed to only 
transfer an additional 2.9 percent of total agricultural land outside of 
the former homelands (Lahiff and Cousins 2005). Similarly, in Namibia 
land reform has been slow and heavily criticized. For example, in 2013 
the Namibian government announced that 345 farms have been acquired 
since 1991 for a grand total of 2.4 million hectares, and 5,000 families have 
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been resettled on these farms (Immanuel 2013). While the government 
viewed these efforts as a sign of progress, many question the likelihood 
of agricultural success in the context of increasingly competitive and 
concentrated global agricultural markets. The questionable likelihood of 
success is due to the small farm size relative to the harsh environment that 
these families are being settled upon. The dry environment means that the 
number of animals that can be supported on approximately 450 hectares 
is low. In addition, the amount of technological support and agricultural 
extension many of these newly resettled farmers will need to farm success-
fully is viewed as largely lacking.
Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland have to contend with issues of land 
reform, but for significantly different reasons. These three countries have 
an abundance of smallholders situated on communal lands, as opposed 
to land owned privately. Table 1.1 provides a comparison of communally 
owned lands in contrast to privately owned lands. All five of the countries 
in this analysis have debated the role of communal lands, but Botswana, 
Lesotho, and Swaziland’s governments have received significantly more 
pressure (by outside donor agencies and development experts) to consider 
privatizing communal lands. For example, there is growing pressure from 
outside experts for Swaziland to implement land reform. Population pres-
sures, increasing water scarcity, and rising poverty rates are all contribut-
ing to academics and donor institutions, like the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), recommending privatization so that smallholders have 
incentives for improving the land (e.g., installing irrigation systems) (see 
IRIN 2013). Generally, there are many reasons for encouraging privatiza-
tion of communal lands across the region, but the most common reasons 
include arguments for increasing the productivity of agriculture and the 
belief that communal lands suffer from higher rates of land degradation 
relative to privately held lands.
Table 1.1  Land distribution in Southern Africa as a percentage of total 
land
Individual tenure Communal lands Other public lands
Botswana 5 70 25
Lesotho 5 90 5
Namibia 44 41 15
South Africa 72 14 14
Swaziland 40 60 0
Source: Adapted from Garcia (2004).
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Land reform and redistribution is a complex topic, which demands 
contextual specificity within Southern Africa. Nonetheless, a few over-
arching points can be made. First, reform of communal lands needs to 
pay special attention to the legal status and economic activities of women 
and the poor, as they are the ones who disproportionally depend upon the 
commons (Adams 2003; Wily 2011). Moreover, in this era of global land 
grabs and corporate consolidation of agriculture, Wily (2011) argues that 
the weak legal status of communal rights allows national governments to 
take undue liberties with their citizens’ lands, which is another reason that 
government land reform activities demand scrutiny.
Finally, low agricultural productivity and environmental concerns are 
very real for many in Southern Africa, but land reform has often been used 
as a means to try and insert pastoralists into formal legal systems of land 
tenure. Specifically, support for land reform often rests on an assumption 
that pastoralists do not fit within the dominant economic, legal, and sci-
entific paradigms of global agriculture. Building on the work of Douglas 
North (1990), Galaty (2013: 477) observes that communal “systems of 
tenure are undergoing formalization, with various parties gaining legal 
rights to land long held by pastoral societies, whether the state, local elites, 
foreign companies, conservation entities or communities themselves.” 
Many economists, public policy officials, and scholars believe formaliza-
tion of land tenure arrangements is a prerequisite for increasing economic 
efficiency (Galaty 2013), though this belief is not fully supported by the 
existing data. For example, Feeny et al. (1990) argue that evidence gath-
ered over a 22 year period (1968–1990) reveals that private, state, or com-
munal property are all potentially viable resource management options. 
Rather, a more complete theory of land tenure should incorporate institu-
tional arrangements and cultural factors to provide for better analysis and 
prediction of effective resource management. Despite the counterevidence, 
the dominant belief of economic efficiency being gained through privatiza-
tion means that land tenure reform that targets communal lands should 
simultaneously be viewed as a political and economic project within the 
current globalizing agrifood system.
Of course, land reform in South Africa and Namibia rightly has a 
substantial amount of political currency among the vast majority of the 
population due to the persistence of extremely inequitable landholdings. 
However, land reform alone will not solve some of the bigger issues facing 
Southern Africa. Tackling increasing inequality, especially in Botswana, 
Namibia, and South Africa, and the problem of rural and urban poverty 
throughout the region will require a much more integrated approach 
than simply focusing on land reform and land tenure (O’Laughlin et al. 
2013). Nor should it be assumed that improved land tenure equates 
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with increased agricultural production, as Ferguson (2013) argues rural 
people use lands in a variety of ways only one of which is for agricultural 
production.
Gender
Women form a substantial percentage of smallholders in Southern Africa. 
They tend to face constraints similar to the larger smallholder popula-
tion in terms of maintaining food security and incomes (FAO 2013). 
Constraints include lack of: secure land tenure, access to adequate 
financing, extension services, production inputs (e.g., genetic diversity, 
fertilizer), and up- to- date technology and training (see Ransom and Bain 
2011). However, women tend to experience these constraints more deeply 
and “as a result it is far more difficult for rural women than for rural men 
to reach their full potential as farmers and livestock keepers” (FAO 2013: 
9). In addition, poverty continues to be concentrated within rural areas, 
with the poorest and most vulnerable disproportionally being “young, 
female and black” (O’Laughlin et al. 2013: 2).
Small ruminants (goats and sheep) are an important source of liveli-
hoods for smallholders throughout the developing world (FAO 2013), 
and women tend to be the people charged with managing them. The Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that 
in Africa as a whole, goats represent about 30 percent of the ruminant 
livestock and contribute about 17 percent of the continent’s meat and 12 
percent of the continent’s milk (Ibid.). Among the countries in this analy-
sis, sheep and/or goat meat rank in the top ten agricultural commodities 
produced by value for all five countries (FAOSTAT 2012). However, 
similar to the slaughter of cattle, men tend to oversee the slaughter and 
sale of small ruminants, thereby reducing some of the potential earnings 
of women. In general, there continues to be a need to focus on gender 
inequality within agriculture in Southern Africa.
ALTERNATIVE PATHS FORWARD
Noticeably absent from this discussion is HIV/AIDS, especially since 
the countries in this discussion have among the highest infection rates in 
Southern Africa and the world. For example, Swaziland is considered to 
have the highest prevalence rate, 26 percent of the population, while South 
Africa is considered to have the most HIV infected people in the world, 
with 5.6 million people infected, which is 17.3 percent of the population 
(UNICEF 2009). While earlier studies argued that the loss of an adult 
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would be devastating to smallholder production, more recent studies sug-
gests HIV/AIDS has not impacted smallholders as much as previously 
predicted (Jayne et al. 2010; McKeever 2008). Deaths of adults are occur-
ring, but households for the most part appear to be able to offset the loss 
of the family member (see Jayne et al. 2010; McKeever 2008 for references 
to recent research). Jayne et al. (2010: 1392) suggest that a better approach 
might be to acknowledge that many African countries are “facing a serious 
development crisis, driven by various trends – of which HIV/AIDS is but 
one – which together are making smallholder livelihoods and welfare more 
and more tenuous, particularly for the large percentage of smallholders 
with highly constrained access to land and education.”
Sustainability of the agrifood system of Southern Africa will become 
increasingly urgent due to climate change. However, adopting sustain-
able approaches to agrifood production is not a foregone conclusion. For 
many in Southern Africa, including producers, processors, and govern-
ment officials, the current economic system encourages the pursuit of 
industrial production methods, which tend to be resource, particularly 
water, intensive. It cannot simply be assumed that sustainable approaches 
to food production will be adopted.
At present, the commercial producers in Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland, 
and especially South Africa all utilize industrialized, resource intensive 
agricultural models of production. Changing these models of produc-
tion will prove difficult. The combination of a food insecure region and 
a neoliberal global trade environment that increases uncertainty for pro-
ducers can stall policy makers and producers’ willingness to experiment 
with more sustainable approaches (Mather 1996). Moreover, the ongoing 
negotiations between the EU and individual Southern African countries, 
do not privilege more sustainable production techniques. Rather, many 
of the “behind the border” issues being negotiated either maintain the 
status quo, or further instantiate more industrial modes of production, 
with little attention to long- term environmental suitability or the impact 
on smallholders.
Furthermore, it should not be assumed that commercial or smallholder 
producers are aware of or thinking strategically about the impact of 
climate change on agriculture in Southern Africa. At present, there is a 
lack of data about producers’ attitudes towards and knowledge about 
climate change in Southern Africa. Antidotal evidence from the author’s 
own research suggests that there are a range of attitudes among commer-
cial livestock producers in Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa. While 
some are aware of likely changes, at least a few do not believe in climate 
change, and few of the commercial livestock producers interviewed in 
these three countries appear to have a strategy for dealing with drier and 
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more sporadic weather patterns in the future. This lack of knowledge or 
adaption strategies suggests the need for more institutional engagement, 
particularly among the government ministries of agriculture and private 
sector or non- governmental trade associations.
There are clearly also opportunities for working with smallholders to 
pursue more sustainable production techniques. As smallholders continue 
to be a sizeable portion of the population in all five countries, this would 
not be an insignificant accomplishment. However, successful engagement 
with smallholders will require an increased recognition of the heterogene-
ity of smallholders in the region. Specifically, recognizing smallholders 
better positioned to adopt capital intensive projects or consider adopting 
more collaborative approaches, such as hybrid models where smallholders 
work with larger farmers and vertically integrated enterprises (Collier and 
Dercon 2014; Mather 1996; Jayne et al. 2010). Such efforts will require not 
only a renewed investment in resources, but also increases in knowledge 
co- construction (e.g., Newsham and Thomas 2011), where techniques for 
sustainable production are informed by the actual practices of smallhold-
ers. The institutional support for such measures will likely need to come 
from collaborative arrangements between national governments, non- 
governmental organizations, international donors, and smallholders.
Finally, there are opportunities for increasing urban and peri- urban 
agriculture. One study conducted in Namibia found that with the increas-
ing migration of rural people to major cities in search of work there 
has been a significant increase in gardening (Dima, Ogunmokun, and 
Nantanga 2002). Rural to urban migration will continue to occur in the 
coming decades. Facilitating the growth of urban gardens could be one 
mechanism for decreasing food insecurity in urban spaces. Some of the 
challenges that would need to be dealt with in order to promote urban and 
peri- urban gardening include limited access to water; a lack of regulatory 
oversight, such as access to land and reporting of problems such as theft; 
and a lack of extension service personnel in urban spaces. Extension per-
sonnel could assist in improving urban gardens through increased knowl-
edge related to types of plants grown and improved growing techniques.
In sum, there are many challenges facing Southern African agriculture. 
Climate change, international trade agreements, particularly with the 
EU, and a large percentage of subsistence smallholders are some of the 
principal issues shaping agricultural development at present. Pursuing 
solutions that are sensitive to the needs and cultures of smallholders, 
including women, who largely rely on communal lands, will take ingenu-
ity and perseverance. However, without a sustained effort to engage with 
the issues reviewed here, the rural populations of Southern Africa will 
increasingly be vulnerable to political, economic, and climatic shocks to 
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the  agricultural system, and these shocks will likely have unique spillover 
effects for the Southern African region (e.g., increased rural to urban 
migration, added pressure on the existing welfare safety nets, growing 
environmental degradation).
NOTES
1. Botha (2013: 247) claims Rhodesia (present day Zimbabwe) and South Africa both had 
interventionist strategies in homelands, the lands upon which indigenous communities 
were confined, before 1960.
2. The reasons for the high rates of inequality across the three countries are diverse, but 
McKeever (2008) argues that one common reason is the reliance of each country on 
mineral wealth. He argues that while mineral wealth increases the overall size of an 
economy, “only a few people reap the benefits of these industries, as most workers in 
most of these countries work in agriculture” (McKeever 2008: 460).
3. The AGOA was signed into law on May 18, 2000 by the US government, and initially 
34 Sub- Saharan African countries were identified as eligible for the trade benefits from 
AGOA. Swaziland’s AGOA status was revoked by the Obama administration in June 
2014 due to concerns over governance in Swaziland. Swaziland officials are currently 
appealing to the Obama administration to reconsider the revocation, scheduled to go 
into effect in January 2015 (AGOA.info 2014).
4. This was also the case for women in the United States prior to the industrialization of the 
poultry industry prior to World War II (Neth 1994; Sachs 1996).
5. See WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provi 
sions_e.htm.
6. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland signed an interim EPA on June 4, 2009, while 
Namibia initiated negotiations, but has not signed; South Africa does not qualify for an 
EPA and it has its own trade agreement with the EU (see Hurt 2012).
7. This is particularly true in South Africa, where extensive deregulation of the agriculture 
sector has occurred and current policies tend to favor more capital intensive operations.
8. As the next section explains, communal farmers are usually considered smallholders.
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